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1. Introduction 
 
Electoral systems play a crucial role in shaping electoral incentives within which public 
policies are established. Political economy literature comprises a substantial body of 
work devoted to the task of exploring the impact on public expenditure of plurality 
versus proportional electoral rules, and of the size of electoral districts. However, 
almost no attention has been paid, except in a recent work by Bordignon et al. (2011), 
to the possibility that elections do not take place in a one-shot game, but in a two-
stage process as characterised by certain current electoral systems (i.e. double ballot 
systems or run-off systems). 
We will focus our attention on the Italian case, which is very interesting from the point 
of view of the impact of different electoral systems on fiscal policies, since it includes 
municipalities which adopt the single ballot system, and others that adopt the double 
ballot system, depending on the size of their respective populations.  If a municipality’s 
population is less than 15,000, the mayor is elected by means of a single ballot system, 
otherwise the election is conducted according to  a double ballot system. 
By using a data set on the financial and electoral characteristics of Italian 
municipalities, we find evidence that, as a result of different electoral rules, per capita 
total taxes and charges in large municipalities are lower than in small ones. Moreover, 
if only one party supports the mayor in a large municipality, then current expenditure 
also falls, albeit to a lesser extent than total taxes and charges. However, if the mayor 
of a large municipality has been elected by a broad coalition, then he/she will behave 
similarly to the mayor of a small municipality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section outlines the 
financial and electoral characteristics of Italy’s municipalities. Section 3 reviews the 
relevant literature. The dataset is illustrated in Section 4. In Section 5 we develop the 
empirical approach to testing the impact of electoral systems on fiscal policies; while 
Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses the role of party coalitions. Section 8 
concludes. 
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 2. Institutional framework 
 
The Italian Constitution provides for five layers of government: central government, 
the regions (ordinary statute regions and special statute regions), the provinces, the 
local municipalities, and the metropolitan authorities (which are yet to be constituted). 
More specifically, local government currently comprises 8,094 municipalities (2012), 
ranging in size from small villages to large towns. 
As regards their share of the overall government budget, municipalities account for 
about 8.6% of total public expenditure in Italy. They are responsible for a large array of 
important public programmes in the field of welfare services, territorial development, 
local transport, infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police 
services, as well as most infrastructural spending. On the revenue side, as a result of a 
lengthy process of fiscal devolution, municipalities can presently rely on own-source 
taxes for about 30% of their total revenue. The main municipal taxes are a property 
tax, a tax on urban waste disposal, a tax on the occupation of public space, and a 
surtax on the personal income tax levied by central government. With regard to these 
taxes, municipalities have some degree of freedom to set rates and to establish other 
basic elements of the tax bases. Other revenue derives from various charges for public 
utilities and for services such as refuse collection, or the provision of public 
infrastructures, as well as taking the form of transfers from central government which 
account for a quite considerable share (about 30%) of the municipal budget.1 
As for the municipal-level electoral system, since 1993 Italy has opted for a mayor-
council system: the municipal council members and the mayor are separately elected 
directly by citizens in elections normally held every 5 years. The mechanism of direct 
election implies that the mayor is endowed with strong powers over municipal politics 
(a basic feature of presidential government), even though the council retains the 
power to dismiss the mayor by means of a vote of no confidence in him/her (a basic 
                                                             
1 The financing mechanism applying to municipalities located in the Special Statute Regions greatly differs from the 
abovementioned standard arrangements, since in the former case, transfers from the corresponding regions 
contribute considerably towards municipal revenues. 
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feature of parliamentary government).2The council performs this task through the 
discussion and approval of the executive’s courses of action as set out in the 
programme that the mayor has to submit to the council together with his/her budget 
proposals. If a vote of approval is not passed, then two different scenarios may ensue: 
either the government continues with its action without the council exercising its 
extreme power; or else the council does in fact exercise said power by voting a motion 
of no confidence, which if approved leads to new elections for both the council and 
the mayor (Scarciglia, 1993). 
There are two different systems for the election of the mayor, and of the municipal 
council, depending on the number of inhabitants in the municipality. The first applies 
to municipalities with up to 15,000 inhabitants (referred to herein as “small” 
municipalities), while the second applies to those with more than 15,000 inhabitants 
(“large” municipalities). According to the 2001 census, the small municipalities number 
7,430 (that is, the vast majority of Italian municipalities), whereas there are 664 large 
ones. 
In small municipalities, the electoral system is quite simple: each mayoral candidate is 
associated with a list of candidates for councillors. Voters are entitled to vote for a 
mayoral candidate and may cast, if they wish, a preference vote for a specific 
candidate for councillor. The mayoral candidate who gains the largest number of votes 
is elected mayor, and two-thirds of council seats are attributed to the list supporting 
the winning mayoral candidate. The remaining seats are attributed proportionally 
among the other lists. Hence, small municipalities will never be faced with a "divided" 
government, that is, a mayor and a council majority of different political colours. 
A double-ballot majoritarian electoral mechanism is applied in the case of large 
municipalities. Each mayoral candidate is associated with one list, or coalition of lists, 
of candidates for the post of councillor; in the first ballot, voters are entitled to vote 
for a mayoral candidate and, if they wish, for one list associated, or otherwise, with 
said candidate (that is, a split vote is permitted). Each mayoral candidate must officially 
declare his/her affiliation to one or more lists running for election to the council. This 
                                                             
2 This system of government is referred to by Fabbrini (2001) as a case of semi-parliamentarism. 
4
declaration shall only be deemed valid if it coincides with similar declarations made by 
the candidates featured on the lists in question. In other words, a coalition of parties is 
offered to electors. The mayoral candidate who receives the absolute majority of votes 
is elected mayor in the first ballot; the lists for the municipal council linked with the 
elected mayor are assigned a majority premium of 60% of all council seats provided 
they obtain at least 40% of votes cast; otherwise, the council seats are assigned 
proportionately among those lists receiving votes, with no majority premium being 
assigned in this case. 
If the mayoral candidate does not receive the absolute majority of votes in the first 
ballot, then a second ballot is held between the two candidates collecting the largest 
number of votes in the first round. In the period between the first and second ballots, 
the lists excluded during the first round can now join those that are backing one of the 
two candidates in the second round, thus creating a sort of band-wagoning effect. 
During the second ballot, voters are entitled to vote for a mayoral candidate, whereas 
votes for lists are precluded. The candidate who ultimately obtains the absolute 
majority of votes is elected mayor. As in the case of a mayor elected to office in the 
first ballot, if those lists of candidates for council members associated with the elected 
mayor receive more than 40% of votes in the first ballot (and no other group of lists 
associated with a rival mayoral candidate obtains the absolute majority), then they are 
entitled to the majority premium (60% of the total number of seats); the seats of the 
coalition of lists receiving said majority premium are distributed in proportion to the 
votes received by each candidate and by the list supporting that candidate. If the 
coalition of lists supporting the mayor fails to get the majority premium, then the 
council seats are assigned in proportion to the votes received by each list during the 
first round of voting. Therefore in this case, the elected mayor may belong to a party 
that is not part of the political majority controlling the council. In practice, this 
happens very rarely due to the fact that political parties tend to form larger alliances 
than they do under the single ballot system, in order to avoid ending up with divided 
governments. 
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 3. Related literature 
 
As mentioned above, the literature on political economy has thoroughly explored the 
impact on public spending of the type of electoral system - plurality versus 
proportional electoral rules - and of the size of electoral districts (Austen-Smith, 2000; 
Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Mayerson, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Apart from a 
recent work by Bordignon et al. (2011), no-one has given much thought to the fact that 
an election may not necessarily involve a “one-shot” game, but may consist in a two-
stage process as happens in the so-called double ballot system. Broadly speaking, 
during the first round, voters select a subset of candidates from those standing for 
election, and then vote again from said subset during the second round of voting. The 
best known example of this system is the one adopted in France for the Presidential 
elections, where the two candidates who receive the greatest number of votes in the 
first ballot, go on to a second, final round. Other examples of this double-ballot system 
are to be found in Latin America, in the USA for the gubernatorial elections, and, as 
described above, in Italy for the election of municipal mayors. 
Previous literature comparing single versus double ballot systems looked mainly at the 
equilibrium number of competing parties. As a matter of fact, according to Duverger's 
Law (1954) ‘‘simple-majority single-ballot favors the two party system’’ whereas 
‘‘simple majority with a second ballot or proportional representation favors 
multipartyism.” This intuition has been formalized (Cox, 1997; Mayerson, 1999) as the 
M+1 rule: if M is the number of seats available, M+1 turns to be the number of 
candidates on whom the voters have an incentive, given the strategic behavior favored 
by the voting mechanism, to concentrate their votes. As a matter of fact, in a single 
ballot plurality rule election, if a citizen believes that candidates 1 and 2 have the 
greatest chances of winning the election, even if said citizen’s preferred candidate is 
candidate 3, he/she strategically chooses to vote for 1 or 2 in order to maximize 
his/her chances of being a pivotal voter. As all voters vote according to a similar logic, 
candidate 3 is deserted by his/her supporters, who all vote for candidates 1 or 2. 
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Similarly, in the first round of a double ballot plurality rule election, given that two 
seats are at stake in this case, three candidates remain in the running for the second 
round of voting (Cox 1997, Martinelli 2002). Note, however, that this holds when there 
is no risk of the unexpected victory of the minority candidate during the first round, 
that is, when the share of electors backing said candidate is very small (Bouton, 2010). 
Recently Fujiwara (2011) uses figures for mayoral elections held in Brazil in 1996-2004, 
to provide evidence that a transition from the single to the dual ballot system leads to 
an increase in the number of votes cast for third-placed candidates, and a reduction 
not only in the gap between the votes cast for the second and third-placed candidates, 
but also in that between the winning candidate and the third-placed candidate. 
Bordignon et al. (2011), using data on mayoral elections in Italy during the period 
1985-2007,  found that the dual ballot leads to a larger number of candidates than the 
single ballot. However, they also found that in the presence of a highly polarized 
electorate, the dual-ballot system reduces the influence of extremist groups on 
political policies. The dual-ballot system allows moderate parties to run on their own 
platforms, without being forced to reach a compromise with such extremist parties, 
while given the same level of polarization, the single-ballot system favours coalitions of 
moderates and extremists. However, it should be pointed out that if the share of 
voters attached to extremist parties is high enough, there will be no substantial 
difference in the results obtained by the single- and double-ballot systems, and in the 
case of the double-ballot system, two coalitions of moderates and extremists will 
emerge, replicating the outcome of the single ballot. 
The relevance of the diverse impact of the two electoral rules is clearly an empirical 
question. The aim of this paper is exactly that of testing the effect of the two different 
electoral rules on fiscal policies, using political and financial data from Italian 
municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
7
4. Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a data-set for Italy’s municipalities resulting from a 
combination of different archives publicly available from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior, the Italian Ministry of the Economy and the Italian Statistical Office. This panel 
data set covers all Italian municipalities for the period 2001-2006. It comprises a full 
array of information organized into four different sections: 1) fiscal data on spending 
and revenue items; 2) institutional data on the main political and personal features of 
municipal bodies (mayor, municipal executive, municipal council), as recorded at the 
end of each year; 3) electoral data covering the results of elections in which the mayor 
and the council members in office during the period covered by the data-set, were 
elected; 4) municipal demographic and socio-economic data such as population size, 
population age structure, and the average income of inhabitants. 
 
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
 
As previously mentioned, we are interested in checking if, and how, the electoral 
system affects those budgetary decisions taken at municipal level. Therefore, as our 
dependent variables we have adopted information on own revenue, subdivided into 
taxes and charges, and information on municipal expenditure. Moreover, the 
peculiarities of municipal funding in Italy’s Special Statute Regions (see note 3), suggest 
that we limit the sample used in this analysis to those municipalities situated in the 
country’s Ordinary Statute Regions (numbering 6,702 in 2010). 
 
 
4.2 The municipal electoral rule and other political variables 
 
As we have already seen, the municipal electoral rule prescribes two different electoral 
systems for small and large municipalities. This variation in the electoral mechanism is 
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possibly exogenous with respect to policy-makers’ decisional area: we set a dummy 
(large) equal to one when the mayor of a municipality, who held office in a certain year 
during the period 2001-2006, was elected according to the large-municipality rule, or 
to zero when, on the contrary, he/she was elected according to the small-municipality 
rule. The result is that our sample includes both those municipalities where the 
mayor(s) in office each single year over the period 2001-2006 was (were) elected by 
means of one single electoral system, and those where mayors in office in different 
years were elected under both electoral rules. 
In this regard, it should be pointed out that the 15,000-inhabitant threshold for the 
choice of electoral system to be applied in a given municipality/election year, is not 
measured with reference to the actual resident population that year, but rather to the 
"certified" population as recorded by the census carried out during the first year of 
each decade by the Italian Statistical Office (e.g. for all those elections held during the 
decade 1991-2000, the "reference" population is the one recorded in the census 
carried out in 1991, and so on). This prevents information about population size being 
misreported by local authorities in order to endogenously select the electoral 
mechanism to be applied in a given election year. Moreover, given these operational 
arrangements, the electoral rule may only lead to a change in the electoral system 
adopted in a given municipality if an increase/decrease in the "certified" population 
over and above the discontinuity threshold of 15,000 inhabitants (which, as already 
mentioned, may occur once a decade) actually applies in the election years that fall, as 
a rule every 5 years, during that decade.3 
Finally, with regard to the data set, each treatment is generally associated with more 
than one observation, since the term of office is, as mentioned, normally 5 years, while 
the panel is built on an annual basis. 
                                                             
3 This means that the actual population of a given municipality between election years may fluctuate below or 
above the threshold, without this automatically triggering a change in the electoral mechanism: the treatment 
variable of the regression discontinuity design is, from 2003 onwards (the year starting from which the 2001 census 
was used to redefine municipalities’ election rules), the population of the 2001 census, and before 2003 the 
population of the 1991 census. 
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We measure the political power of the mayor by using the number of votes (voteshare) 
cast in the first ballot. Moreover, a categorical variable (list) accounts for the number 
of lists associated, in the first round, with the mayoral candidate running under the 
double-ballot rule. Since Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two 
consecutive mandates for the office of mayor, a dummy variable (termlimit) has been 
created to indicate whether a mayor in office in a given year is in his/her second 
consecutive term of office, and thus ineligible for a further term: the impossibility of 
further re-election may significantly bias the budgetary decisions of a municipality 
(Besley and Case 1995; List and Sturm 2006). 
 
 
4.3. Socio-economic and demographic controls 
 
We include a set of time-varying variables that characterize a municipality's economic 
and demographic situation, namely: the population of the municipality (population); 
per capita income proxied by the personal income tax base (income); the proportion of 
citizens aged between 0 and 14 (child); and the proportion aged over 65 (aged). 
Finally, there are certain time-constant characteristics of a municipality that are likely 
to affect fiscal policies, such as climate and geography. We take these characteristics 
into account by including a dichotomous variable for each municipality. Changes in the 
macroeconomic situation may also affect the fiscal policies of all municipalities in 
certain specific years. To account for this, we include a set of time dummies controlling 
for common yearly shocks. 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
 
We test the impact on revenue of being elected on the basis of the large-municipality 
electoral-rule, by estimating the following reduced form equation: 
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taxtotmt = αm+βt+γ₁largemt+γ₂Zmt+εmt,      (1) 
 
where taxtotmt is the real per capita current revenue, net of received transfers in 
municipality m at time t, which corresponds to taxes + charges We estimate also taxes 
(tax) and charges (charge) separately. As mentioned before, the dummy largemt equals 
1 if the municipality falls within the large municipality electoral system, and zero 
otherwise. 
As in all subsequent regressions, we include municipality-fixed effects (αm) and year 
dummies (βt). Zmt is a vector including a dummy equal to one if the mayor cannot run 
for re-election (termlimit), real income per capita (income), population size (pop), the 
square of population size (popsquare) and the other population controls to the power 
of three and four, the percentage of citizens aged 65 or over (aged), the percentage of 
citizens between 0 and 14 years of age (child), the number of citizens per area 
(density), the percentage of votes (voteshare) obtained by the mayor when elected (in 
particular, in the first round of voting in the case of double-ballot municipalities), and a 
dummy equal to one (ballot) if the mayor of the municipality has been elected at the 
run-off. We maintain these explanatory variables in all the regressions performed, as 
standard economic, political and demographic controls. 
As long as γ₁ is statistically significant, we can confirm that being in a large electoral 
regime will affect the tax decisions made by municipalities, and the size of the 
coefficient measures the impact on the level of taxes + charges set by the mayor when 
he/she is elected according to the large-municipality electoral mechanism. 
Symmetrically, we estimate a reduced form for real per capita expenditure by using 
the following equation: 
 
expmt=γs+δt+θ₁largemt+θ₂Zmt+εmt,      (2) 
 
where expmt is the real per capita current expenditure in municipality m at time t; γm 
are municipalities' fixed effects, and δt are year dummies. As long as θ₁ is statistically 
significant, we can confirm that being in a double-ballot system affects, for reasons of 
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electoral convenience, the spending decisions made by the municipality. The 
coefficient θ₁ measures the impact on the level of current expenditure set by the 
mayor, when he/she is elected by means of the large municipality electoral 
mechanism. 
 
 
5.1 Empirical analysis 
 
The financial variables we are interested in are very likely related to actual population, 
due to scale economies for expenditure, or to agglomeration economies for revenues; 
actual population is, by year, closely correlated to the certified population, thus 
implying that treatment could be determined solely by the level of population: pop 
must be controlled to assess the effect of large on the dependent variable. However, 
in our case there is no overlap in pop values across the small and large electoral 
groups; in fact, the threshold for being in one or other electoral regime is given by 
pop=15,000. We thus need to use a regression discontinuity design: in this case, the 
direct effect of pop on the dependent variable is in fact negligible compared to the 
effect of pop on large when pop is near the threshold τ=15,000. Let us re-write (1) in 
the following form: 
taxtot=α+β+γ₁large+g(pop)+γ₂Q+ε large=0,1 
 
where we assume that: 
 
lim E(ε⁰|S)= lim E(ε¹|S)        (3) 
POP→τ              POP→τ 
 
g(.) unknown function at pop = τ       (4) 
 
where α is the municipality fixed effect, β is the year fixed effect, Q is the vector of all 
exogenous controls excluding population, S is the vector including all the exogenous 
variables (those in Q and pop), ε⁰ is the random error component for municipalities 
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belonging to the small municipality group, ε¹ is the random error component for 
municipalities belonging to the large municipality group and g(pop) is an unknown 
function linking the dependent variable to pop. Assumptions (3) and (4) are for 
borderline randomization: those subjects near the threshold are likely to be similar in 
all aspects except in the treatment: (3) is for the similarities between the non-
observables and (4) for the similarities between the observables. 
Note that: 
 
lim E(large|pop)=1  and  lim E(large|pop)=0   (5) 
pop↓τ      pop↑τ 
 
and: 
 
lim E(taxtot|pop) =α+β+γ₁+ lim g(pop)+lim E(ε¹ |pop) 
pop↓τ    pop↓τ                    pop↓τ  
 
lim E(taxtot|pop) =α+β+lim g(pop)+lim E(ε⁰|pop┊) 
pop↑τ           pop↑τ                     pop↑τ  
⇒ lim E(taxtot|pop)-limE(taxtot|pop) = γ₁ 
pop↓τ          pop↑τ 
 
γ₁ is identified with the difference between the right and left limits of E(taxtot|pop) at 
pop=15,000. Of course, the same would hold true for (2). 
The econometric strategy adopted here results in a difference-in-difference estimate 
of (1) and (2) through the adoption of a regression discontinuity (DID-RD) approach 
(Egger and Koethenburgen, 2010). The traditional RD, while allowing treatment-
specific parameters, would assume identical coefficients for all the other parameters, 
since the regressions would be run on the pooled dataset. However, if municipalities 
are heterogeneous in terms of the time-invariant variables correlated with the 
treatment dummy, then the estimate of the treatment effect would be biased. If a 
panel dataset is available, the approach combining the regression discontinuity design 
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with the difference-in-difference technique, enables us to control for fixed effects and 
to overcome the problem of bias.4 
We estimate the limit of the two regression functions on both side of the threshold 
using two methods: a polynomial approximation, and a local linear regression (see 
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). We normalize pop to 0 when it equals 15,000, since we 
control not only for the polynomial functional form of the population, but we also 
interact the same function with the dummy large: the normalization enables us to 
consistently estimate average effect of local treatment γ₁, otherwise it would be biased 
by the interaction with pop. When adopting the first approach we use the entire 
sample of municipalities with a population of between 10,000 and 20,0005, and choose 
a polynomial functional form to fit the relationship between the dependent variable 
and pop: we provide estimates by using a second, third and fourth degree polynomial 
function. The second method fits linear regression functions to the observations 
distributed within a certain distance h either side of the threshold; we also control for 
population and its interaction with the dummy large, as in the previous case. We 
provide estimates by choosing different bandwidths around the threshold, namely 
h=1000, 2h and h/2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Another way around the problem is to compare the outcome of the same subject under two different treatments, 
given that the values of the variable related to the treatment, before and after the change, are close to one 
another. This method (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012), instead of using the difference-in-difference approach to control 
for the municipality fixed effect, thus also taking advantage of the comparison between those municipalities not 
experiencing any switch from one electoral system to the other, excludes all municipalities that do not switch 
systems. The obvious drawback of this approach is that removing all such municipalities leaves us with a limited 
number of observations, and this in turn reduces the efficiency of the estimate. 
5 In this population interval there is no other institutional break apart from that at 15,000 inhabitants with regard to 
the electoral rule. For a detailed list of Italian institutional breaks at various population levels, see Gagliarducci and 
Nannicini (2013). 
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6. Results 
 
We ran two sets of regressions respectively for taxes and current expenditure, using a 
regression discontinuity design.6 Panel A of Table 2 gives the baseline results, while in 
panel B we also add control variables as a robustness check.7 The coefficient (column 
1) of the dummy large in the taxes + charges (taxtot) estimate is always negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in all three polynomial specifications, thus 
meaning that the election of a mayor in a double-ballot voting system reduces fiscal 
pressure compared to the election of a mayor in a single ballot system. Moreover, in 
the 4th degree polynomial specification, the coefficient in the current expenditure 
estimate (exp) is also negative and 5% significant, but it is only half the size of that in 
the taxtot equation. These results are confirmed when we use the specifications 
including covariates. 
If we look at the estimates using the local linear specifications, the previous results on 
taxtot and exp are confirmed within all three bandwidths, except in the case of current 
expenditure when we use the 2h bandwidth (see Table 2, panel A, column 4). 
These results are also evident in Fig. 1, panels A and B, where taxes + charges and 
current expenditure (we take the average for each period after an election in the 
sample with a population ranging from 10,000 to 20,000) are related to a quadratic 
polynomial function of the certified population of those municipalities switching from 
one regime to the other, normalized at 15,000. 
Finally, we made a robustness check of our results by running a placebo test for both 
the polynomial and the local linear regressions. We used the sample of municipalities 
with populations of between 10,000 and 20,000, and in the sub-sample of the small 
municipalities we set a threshold corresponding to the median population (12,154), 
and did likewise for the sample of large municipalities, which gave a median 
population of 17,130. We ran the same regressions that we had run with the 15,000 
                                                             
6 In the sample of municipalities with populations of between 10,000 and 20,000, covering the period 2001-2006, 
we eliminated 40 observations pertaining to municipalities whose financial data were clearly misreported. 
7 As long as the RDD identifying assumptions (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) are met, the inclusion of additional 
covariates should not affect the estimates, but simply increase accuracy. 
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threshold, but the coefficient that accounts for the threshold effect was never 
significant (Table 3). 
 
 
7. The role of party coalitions 
 
Bordignon et al. (2011) explain the different fiscal policies observed in the two 
systems, such as those obtained in the case of our own estimates, by pointing out that 
the double ballot system allows moderate parties to run on their own platform, 
without them being forced to reach compromises with extremist parties, whereas the 
single ballot favours coalitions of moderates and extremists. However, certain 
interesting caveats apply to their model when evaluating this result. If a sufficient 
share of voters pledge their votes to extremists, then no difference between the single 
and double ballot systems will emerge, and two coalitions of moderates and 
extremists will form, replicating the single ballot: moderates always prefer allying with 
extremists, as the latter retain important bargaining power. If the share of extremist 
votes is small, on the other hand, then each candidate will run alone since the 
bargaining power of the extremists is entirely wiped out. The reason for this behaviour 
lies in the fact that under the double ballot system, what matters is not winning the 
first round but getting through to the second round and then going on to win the 
election. A centrist party that manages to get through the first round, has a greater 
chance of winning the final election as it can then collect the voters of the excluded 
extremist parties, provided said extremist parties are not overly ideological. 
In the Italian single ballot system, despite the fact that, officially, only one list backs 
each mayoral candidate, what happens is that very often before the election, parties 
bargain and converge towards a single list backing just one candidate. Parties can also 
do the same in the double ballot system without any need to create a single list, simply 
by proposing a coalition of lists backing a given mayoral candidate.  
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7.1 The test 
 
We run two sets of regressions -  one for taxes + charges (taxtot), and one for current 
expenditure -  where we interact the dummy large with the categorical variable list 
accounting for the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the double ballot system negatively affects taxtot 
compared to the single ballot system, but that this effect becomes smoother the 
greater the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate (in the 2nd 
degree polynomial specification, the coefficient of large interacted with the variable 
list is +7.02 and 1% significant). This result is almost entirely due to revenue from 
charges (Column 3 Table 4, panel A). The revenue from taxes, in fact, is always lower 
than in the single ballot system, regardless of the number of lists supporting the 
winning candidate. The impact of the electoral system on current expenditure is also 
affected by the number of lists supporting the candidate who is elected mayor 
(Column 4). All these results are confirmed when we use the third and fourth degree 
polynomial functions. Moreover, all the results obtained in the polynomial 
specifications are more robust if we control for covariates (Table 4, panel B). 
If we look at the estimates obtained using the local linear specifications, they confirm 
the previous results (Table 4, panel A) with the exception of those regarding taxes, 
which are not significant for the h and 2h bandwidth specifications or for current 
expenditure (not significant in the 2h bandwidth specification). When we control for 
covariates (Table 4, panel B), the result for taxtot, and for charge when we use the h/2 
bandwidth, no longer hold. Finally, it should be pointed out that the results for charge 
and exp do not pass all the placebo tests (Table 5, panel B) for the local linear 
approximation specifications, whereas the results for taxtot are very robust to all the 
placebo tests.8 
                                                             
8 The placebo samples are built, as in the previous section, by double-splitting the whole sample at the median 
population. However, it is not easy to falsify the effect of the lists for the right-hand sample. We decided to use the 
true value of the lists for municipalities in the sample that had populations greater than the median, but at the 
same time belonging to the single ballot group. This may be one of the reasons why the test is not very robust. 
Note, in fact, that the placebo test for populations lower than the median, where there is no problem in choosing 
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All in all it seems that, as with previous estimates, the double-ballot electoral rule 
leads to a lower level of public economic activity (a reduction in public spending and 
taxes+charges); however, the more lists supporting the mayor, the closer the fiscal 
policies of single and double-ballot municipalities will be. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the impact of two different electoral systems on fiscal policies, based 
on the case of Italy’s municipal elections. In Italy, municipalities with fewer than 
15,000 inhabitants elect their mayor according to a plurality single-ballot system 
whereby only one list can support the candidate who is eventually elected mayor, and 
very often this list represents a coalition of parties converging in the one list. In 
municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, the mayor is elected according to a 
plurality double-ballot system, whereby an officially-declared coalition of lists may 
support her/him. We use a 2001-2006 panel dataset of all Italian municipalities 
comprising financial, socio-economic and political data. We use both the “between” 
and the “within” dimension of the dataset, by applying the difference-in-difference 
method to a regression discontinuity analysis. 
Our test looks at the effects of the two electoral systems on municipal expenditure and 
revenue. We find that municipalities under the double-ballot system have lower per 
capita taxes and charges than those municipalities where a single-ballot system holds. 
Moreover, current expenditure is also lower, albeit to a much lesser extent than taxes 
and charges. This difference between the two electoral systems becomes increasingly 
less robust, the greater the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral 
candidate in the first round of voting in double-ballot municipalities.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the list in order to falsify the experiment, given that under the single-ballot system only one list can support the 
candidate who is eventually elected mayor, is passed comfortably. 
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Data Appendix 
 
List of variables 
Financial variables: from the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
http://finanzalocale.interno.it/sitophp/home_finloc.php?Titolo=Certificati+Consuntivi 
 tax: total real direct taxes by municipality (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 charges: total real charges and profits (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 taxtot: total real revenue net of borrowing (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 exp: total real public current expenditure (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 
Political variables: the authors' processing of data from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior 
http://amministratori.interno.it/AmmIndex5.htm 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tp=G 
 large: dummy variable equal to one when the municipality has certified population 
of more than 15,000, and zero otherwise. 
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 ballot: dummy variable equal to one when the mayor of a municipality with a 
certified population of more than 15,000 is elected at the second ballot. 
 termlimit: dummy variable equal to one when the mayor of the municipality cannot 
run for the next election because he/she is already in his/her second term of office, 
and zero otherwise. 
 voteshare: percentage of votes obtained by the mayor when elected (the variable 
refers to the first round of voting for double-ballot municipalities) 
 list: number of lists supporting (at first ballot) the successful mayoral candidate in a 
large municipality (with a certified population of more than 15,000). 
 
Demographic and socio-economic variables: from the Italian Ministry of the Interior 
http://finanzalocale.interno.it/ser/ispett.html 
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
www.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20061102_00/ 
 income: real personal income tax base (year 2006 constant euros per capita). 
 pop: state population divided by 1,000. 
 aged: share of the population over the age of 65. 
 child: share of the population aged between 0 and 14. 
 density: the number of citizens per area. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
taxtot 3129 581.1291 245.5408 100.5627 1960.61 
tax 3129 415.8 171.3818 69.10942 1686.768 
charge 3129 165.3291 127.0001 5.179395 1051.38 
exp 3129 677.135 210.2529 138.3801 1814.082 
ballot 3129 0.132311 0.338882 0 1 
child 3129 0.146038 0.024751 0.081628 0.249248 
aged 3129 0.180372 0.04063 0.059914 0.308141 
density 3129 689.5929 852.1794 39.19242 8033.668 
income 3129 9457.351 3292.929 2221.059 20376.77 
voteshare 3129 51.4171 12.01306 16.01187 100 
LARGE 3129 0.250879 0.433588 0 1 
termlim 3129 0.137744 0.344686 0 1 
population 3129 -1303.35 2697.864 -4999 4998 
list 3129 1.667625 1.453711 1 7 
Note: all financial variables are expressed in per capita and in real terms. 
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Table 2: The impact of run-off elections on  fiscal policy outcome: RDD estimates 
A. Estimations without covariates B. Estimations with covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 taxtot tax charge exp taxtot tax charge exp 
         
Pol. 2nd -39.9048** -26.7978* -13.1069 -15.7450 -48.6335** -30.6248* -18.0087 -23.1749 
 (18.095) (14.846) (10.085) (14.131) (19.408) (15.865) (12.024) (15.229) 
Pol. 3nd -37.7691** -28.2713* -9.4978 -13.0823 -46.6152** -32.0307** -14.5845 -20.6281 
 (18.412) (14.553) (10.842) (14.578) (19.869) (15.484) (12.872) (15.804) 
Pol. 4nd -58.8368*** -36.0745** -22.7622* -29.5777* -68.7402*** -40.6786** -28.0616* -36.7551** 
 (19.303) (15.940) (13.031) (15.459) (20.872) (16.746) (15.277) (16.888) 
Observations 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 
         
LLR (h) -47.6250** -18.9807 -28.6444** -31.9915** -53.2365** -20.2855 -32.9510* -27.4175 
 (21.532) (17.633) (12.488) (16.207) (25.855) (22.320) (17.916) (19.531) 
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 
         
LLR (h/2) -85.0175*** -47.1029* -37.9146*** -78.8530*** -39.0090 -16.2990 -22.7100 -41.2516 
 (29.213) (26.571) (11.700) (17.241) (33.517) (31.007) (19.302) (30.166) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
         
LLR(2h) -47.2526** -24.3840 -22.8686** -24.2749 -57.9498** -29.6480 -28.3018** -19.6241 
 (19.542) (15.892) (11.216) (15.131) (22.554) (18.375) (14.390) (16.985) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
         
Notes: Period 2001-2006; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 20,000. Estimation methods: polynomial approximation to the 2nd, 3rd and 
4th degrees, local linear regression with bandwidths h=100, h/2 and 2h. All estimates (impact of the dummy LARGE on dependent variables) include municipality and 
year fixed effects. The estimation in panel B also includes the following covariates: mayor’s second term dummy, mayor’s lame-duck dummy, percentage of votes 
obtained by the mayor when elected (for the double ballot municipalities this refers to the first round), share of population aged between 0 and 14, share of 
population over 65 years of age,  population density computed as the ratio between area and population, per capita personal income tax base. Robust standard 
errors are shown in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 3:Placebo tests on  fiscal policy outcome: RDD estimates 
A. Mean below (12,154) B. Mean above (17,130) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 taxtot tax charge exp taxtot tax charge exp 
         
Pol. 2nd 0.0878 -1.3667 1.4545 3.3066 28.2015 19.7755 8.4260 -14.4262 
 (17.569) (10.803) (14.919) (14.972) (22.959) (15.950) (17.870) (21.132) 
Pol. 3nd 15.3855 2.2102 13.1753 5.8380 35.9465 21.2807 14.6657 -18.8808 
 (22.911) (13.779) (19.028) (18.898) (29.925) (19.288) (22.370) (26.236) 
Pol. 4nd 39.7953 11.5172 28.2782 20.3336 6.8449 -9.5168 16.3618 -9.0436 
 (28.273) (16.034) (23.462) (22.982) (38.311) (24.707) (27.660) (33.021) 
Observations 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 977 977 977 977 
         
        LLR (h) 4.2607 -3.8060 8.0667 5.2477 26.0114 23.7362 2.2752 -22.7699 
 (18.045) (11.150) (15.058) (14.835) (23.846) (15.565) (19.031) (20.390) 
Observations 867 867 867 867 404 404 404 404 
         
LLR (h/2) 7.3662 3.1296 4.2366 1.2650 -26.0150 -11.7610 -14.2539 -45.4248 
 (20.220) (14.565) (17.628) (16.713) (42.167) (25.586) (29.346) (30.855) 
Observations 437 437 437 437 192 192 192 192 
         
LLR(2h) -8.8555 1.2381 -10.0937 -11.4471 15.9271 20.3272 -4.4001 -11.2090 
 (15.272) (9.177) (13.260) (13.222) (17.844) (12.941) (13.650) (16.752) 
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 833 833 833 833 
         
Notes: Period 2001-2006; municipalities with a resident population of between 10,000 and 15,000 (Panel A) and municipalities with a resident population of between 
15,000 and 20,000 (Panel B). Estimated discontinuities in fiscal policy outcomes at false threshold (mean above and below the true 15,000 threshold). Estimation 
methods: polynomial approximation to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th degrees, local linear regression with bandwidth h=100, h/2 and 2h. All estimates include municipality and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
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Table 4: Party coalitions’ contribution to the  impact of run-off elections on  fiscal policy outcome: RDD estimates 
A. Estimations without covariates B. Estimations with covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 taxtot tax charge exp taxtot tax charge exp 
Pol. 2nd         
large -56.8589*** -30.8570** -26.0019** -27.3403* -62.1556*** -31.2949* -30.8607** -33.3598** 
 (19.330) (15.729) (11.103) (15.297) (19.884) (16.221) (12.145) (15.838) 
large*list 7.0205*** 1.6808 5.3397*** 4.8015* 7.4841*** 0.3709 7.1133*** 5.6371** 
 (2.559) (1.846) (2.071) (2.720) (2.722) (2.002) (2.177) (2.845) 
Pol. 3nd         
large -54.9601*** -32.1860** -22.7740* -25.0025 -60.2387*** -32.6205** -27.6183** -30.9614* 
 (19.602) (15.426) (11.764) (15.679) (20.278) (15.846) (12.837) (16.305) 
large*list 7.1400*** 1.6259 5.5141*** 4.9509* 7.5583*** 0.3272 7.2311*** 5.7329** 
 (2.555) (1.848) (2.057) (2.716) (2.719) (2.005) (2.168) (2.844) 
Pol. 4nd         
large -76.3384*** -40.2286** -36.1098** -41.5333** -82.0190*** -41.2828** -40.7363*** -46.7319*** 
 (20.833) (16.759) (14.452) (17.330) (21.518) (17.074) (15.492) (17.916) 
large*list 7.1660*** 1.7009 5.4651*** 4.8952* 7.4750*** 0.3401 7.1349*** 5.6163** 
 (2.542) (1.848) (2.046) (2.710) (2.689) (2.003) (2.142) (2.819) 
Observations 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 3,129 
LLR (h)         
large -61.5311** -26.3800 -35.1510** -49.2977** -64.6042** -24.0110 -40.5932** -45.8709** 
 (25.263) (20.678) (14.689) (21.151) (28.233) (23.884) (18.800) (22.950) 
large*list 6.0057 3.1956 2.8101 7.4742 5.5490 1.8185 3.7305 9.0078* 
 (3.865) (3.302) (2.201) (5.305) (4.057) (3.632) (2.599) (4.785) 
Observations 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 
LLR (h/2)         
large -105.6509*** -64.4014** -41.2495*** -113.4791*** -48.1905 -26.8622 -21.3284 -65.1075* 
 (31.986) (28.820) (13.901) (27.873) (35.157) (31.316) (20.519) (34.565) 
large*list 7.5740 6.3499* 1.2242 12.7104* 4.9119 5.6510 -0.7391 12.7622* 
 (4.648) (3.544) (2.394) (6.885) (4.824) (3.478) (2.905) (6.676) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
LLR(2h)         
large -50.6235** -28.6392 -21.9843* -26.3596 -59.6418** -29.8934 -29.7483** -25.7933 
 (21.938) (17.755) (13.225) (18.044) (23.371) (18.907) (14.705) (18.239) 
large*list 1.4874 1.8776 -0.3902 0.9198 1.0510 0.1525 0.8985 3.8323 
 (3.595) (3.071) (2.295) (4.052) (4.042) (3.383) (2.605) (3.922) 
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 
Notes:see Table 2. 
 
25
Table 5:Placebo tests on  fiscal policy outcome affected by run-off elections and party coalitions: RDD estimates 
A. Mean below (12,154) B. Mean above (17,130) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables taxtot tax charge exp taxtot tax charge exp 
Pol. 2nd         
large 7.0954 5.6214 1.4740 0.0858 4.5840 17.4079 -12.8239 -28.3094 
 (20.203) (12.167) (17.584) (17.883) (23.516) (17.237) (17.765) (20.965) 
large*list -4.9749 -4.9610 -0.0139 2.2865 9.6439*** 0.9668 8.6771*** 5.6690 
 (5.838) (4.901) (3.865) (5.385) (3.632) (2.366) (3.044) (3.924) 
Pol. 3nd         
large 21.7012 8.9878 12.7135 2.5179 11.4865 18.8357 -7.3492 -33.3712 
 (24.653) (14.659) (20.962) (21.181) (30.099) (20.399) (21.828) (26.053) 
large*list -4.6363 -4.9753 0.3390 2.4372 9.6887*** 0.9685 8.7202*** 5.7397 
 (5.844) (4.925) (3.872) (5.352) (3.648) (2.373) (3.055) (3.946) 
Pol. 4nd         
large 46.5287 18.4606 28.0681 17.1480 -16.1830 -11.6383 -4.5447 -23.0575 
 (29.745) (16.871) (24.950) (24.868) (37.985) (25.362) (27.003) (33.063) 
large*list -4.8745 -5.0265 0.1521 2.3062 9.6452*** 0.8886 8.7566*** 5.8697 
 (5.844) (4.933) (3.852) (5.435) (3.653) (2.371) (3.059) (3.955) 
Observations 2,152 2,152 2,152 2,152 977 977 977 977 
LLR (h)          
large -14.5610 -13.9960 -0.5650 -20.4495 -0.9922 20.1993 -21.1914 -45.5372** 
 (31.154) (18.825) (26.343) (26.875) (26.871) (19.126) (21.105) (22.773) 
large*list 13.3971 7.2532 6.1439 18.2910 11.5074** 1.5072 10.0001** 9.7021* 
 (16.409) (12.749) (10.448) (13.023) (5.777) (4.125) (5.051) (5.070) 
Observations 867 867 867 867 404 404 404 404 
 LLR (h/2)         
large -17.6532 -2.4268 -15.2263 -52.3958* -64.9068 -16.9202 -47.9865 -63.3299 
 (32.950) (26.846) (29.918) (30.292) (50.654) (34.945) (36.729) (40.935) 
large*list 18.8937 4.1960 14.6977 40.5225** 16.1785 2.1462 14.0323* 7.4483 
 (21.442) (19.606) (14.610) (17.995) (12.591) (10.028) (8.407) (11.723) 
Observations 437 437 437 437 192 192 192 192 
LLR(2h)         
large -11.0019 6.5987 -17.6006 -31.1551* -12.6627 20.3255 -32.9882** -35.7112* 
 (21.467) (12.790) (18.545) (18.834) (20.089) (14.955) (15.505) (18.518) 
large*list 1.5748 -3.9330 5.5078 14.4596* 11.4977** 0.0007 11.4970*** 9.8538** 
 (9.525) (7.476) (6.217) (7.816) (4.490) (2.856) (3.770) (4.791) 
Observations 1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813 833 833 833 833 
Notes: see table 3. 
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Fig. 1 
 
A ) 
Mean of per capita taxes + charges (taxtot) of municipalities switching from the  
small to the large municipality electoral regime  and vice-versa during the period  
2001-2006. 
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Fig. 1 (continued) 
B)  
Mean of per capita current expenditure (exp) of municipalities switching from the  
small to the large municipality electoral regime  and vice-versa during the period  
2001-2006. 
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